Warrior [19] British Redcoat 1740-93 Page 3
Reconstruction: Interior of folding knapsack showing its three compartments. Modern folding luggage is made to virtually the same pattern.
Discharge from the army
Leaving the army was in some ways surprisingly easy. Conscripts such as the vestry men who earned the army such an ugly reputation after Culloden were enlisted for six months or until the end of the emergency. The volunteers who joined the dozen or so provincial regiments raised at the same time were also discharged when the fighting was over, but each was given a small gratuity of six days’ pay if he elected to go home, or a bounty of two guineas if he re-enlisted in a regular unit. Similarly, during the American War of Independence, a dearth of recruits led to the temporary introduction of short engagements – three years or till the end of the war.
Otherwise, accepting the ‘King’s shilling’ meant, in theory, entering His Majesty’s service for life. In practice this was rarely the case, except where the soldier died of wounds or disease. Normally a soldier, if wishing to leave the army for whatever reason, could obtain his discharge in a number of ways.
In the first place, if a soldier was promoted to commissioned rank, he was first discharged from the rolls of his regiment. If a unit was disbanded at the end of a war, all its NCOs and rank and file were also entitled to receive their discharge. Furthermore, prior to 1770, battalions carried on the Irish establishment mustered only half the number of rank and file allowed to battalions on the British establishment. Consequently those men surplus to requirements when a battalion was transferred to the Irish establishment had to be discharged. There was, of course, a fair chance that any discharged soldier might immediately be picked up by a recruiting party for another unit, but there was no obligation on him to re-enlist.
Similarly, when a unit was ordered home from a colonial posting, soldiers could elect either to be drafted into a unit remaining in the country or, if their own regiment was going home to be disbanded, they could obtain their discharge as free settlers and receive a land-grant into the bargain.
Benefits and pensions
Soldiers wounded in battle or crippled by disease in the King’s service – venereal diseases and chronic alcoholism did not count – were entitled to a range of benefits according to their circumstances.
For the worst cases, there were a limited number of places in the Royal Hospitals at Chelsea and Kilmainham for the British and Irish establishments respectively. Oddly enough, a soldier’s entitlement to a place, or to a pension from either establishment, depended upon which establishment his regiment was carried by at the time of his discharge. So soldiers originally enlisted in Scotland for, say, the 105th Highlanders could find themselves granted a place or a pension from Kilmainham since their regiment was serving on the Irish establishment at the time of its disbandment.
Any soldier still capable of loading his firelock might be assigned to one of the regiments or independent companies of invalids employed in garrison duties. Such units normally served as little more than night-watchmen at military installations in the British Isles, but during the Seven Years War, a battalion was organised to look after the British base at Bremen. Another served in North America in the 1770s. Although these invalids could occasionally be called upon to fight, or help control rioting, their function was more charitable than military.
Entitlement to a pension was limited during this period to those who were in some measure disabled in the service. In other words, if a man was discharged fit and healthy, there was considered to be no reason why he should not be able to support himself, and the best he could reasonably hope for was a gratuity of a few days’ subsistence, sufficient to carry him to his home parish. If, on the other hand, he had been wounded or otherwise disabled in the service, he could be granted an ‘out-pension’ from either Chelsea of Kilmainham. Prior to the 1750s, long service was not in itself a qualification for a pension, but it is clear from the registers that in practice old soldiers could receive one after being certified as ‘worn out’.
TRAINING AND TACTICS
On joining his regiment, the recruit was issued with a basic suit of clothing and embarked upon basic training. Writing in 1759, William Windham prefaced the second part of his excellent Plan of Discipline for the Use of the Norfolk Militia with the following remarks: ‘We must, in the first place, recommend to all gentlemen, who intend to act as militia officers, to arm themselves with a great deal of patience, as they must expect to find many of the countrymen infinitely awkward and stiff; especially those who are turned thirty years of age, and have been used to hard labour. These (though willing and attentive) cannot easily bring their limbs to execute what they are taught, although they perfectly comprehend it. In others they will find a great want of apprehension and memory, and an amazing difficulty of understanding and retain[ing] things and ideas that are new to them, and different from what they have been used to from their cradle. Others again are lazy, careless and want attention. These are certainly very disagreeable circumstances, and must often put an officer’s temper to hard trials.’
First the recruit was taught to be the ‘master of his person’, that is to carry himself properly – ‘chin up, shoulders back and stomach in’. Having thus started off the process of smartening himself up, he proceeded to learn the intricacies of foot drill and maintaining his dressing while marching. The latter was particularly important, for while it was certainly required that he should set off with the left foot, before the 1750s he was not actually required to march in step except when carrying out what were quaintly termed ‘evolutions’ – changes of front or formation. Consequently, dressing had to be preserved by maintaining physical contact with the man next to him while marching.
Weapons training
Once he had mastered, or at least proved himself to be reasonably proficient in, foot drill and marching, he was finally introduced to his firelock. As today, the very first lesson was the naming of the parts. That done, he then learned the ‘manual exercise’ or weapon handling – first without ammunition, then with blank charges and finally with ball.
Of necessity this was a slow process, with the same one-two timing between each movement as is practised today. Once it had been mastered, he moved on to learn the platoon exercise or, more precisely, to learning and practising the actions required of him. This basically entailed getting used to loading and firing in three ranks, which in turn involved not only weapon handling, but endless practice in locking – an important drill movement which is discussed in greater detail below.
Firing at a mark was generally held to be a good thing by everybody except the Treasury. The allocation varied throughout the period, but in peacetime, battalions normally received sufficient powder for between 31,000 and 60,000 rounds a year. If a battalion was fully up to its authorised Establishment, this should have allowed something in the region of 60 to 120 rounds per man; in practice, the allocation was slightly higher, since few battalions were ever fully recruited.
This allocation was probably sufficient to practice the firings as a drill. However, until 1785, battalions also received only a niggardly one hundredweight of shot per annum – roughly 1,200 rounds of ball. The two to four rounds of ball each man could expect to fire in a year would barely have been enough to accustom him to the greater kick of firing a fully loaded weapon, let alone gain any skill in marksmanship. It is little wonder then that in 1774 Major General William Howe reported that the 3rd Foot ‘have not fired Ball for some years’. The previous year, Major General Alexander Mackay had returned from a busy summer’s reviews to report: ‘The Powder given to the Troops is in General very bad, the Flints remarkably so; And the Quantity of Ball so small, that it is impossible to practice the men to fire at Marks, as should be done constantly.’
Rather belatedly, in 1786, the peacetime allocation of ball ammunition to each battalion was upped to 9,600 rounds a year, which then worked out at about 30 rounds per man. This was still on the low side, but a considerable improvement nonetheless. In any
case, it was a different matter in wartime, with ball ammunition then available on demand, and most regiments threw themselves into firing it off with considerable enthusiasm. In the summer of 1757 the 15th Foot were reported to be out three days a week firing seven rounds of ball per man: ‘Every man has fired about 84 rounds, and now load and fire Ball with as much coolness and allacrity in all the different fireings as ever you saw them fire blank powder, hitherto without the smallest accident,’ it was reported.
Similarly, the order book of Captain James Stewart’s company of the 42nd Highlanders reveals the light company firing at marks on 10 March 1759. The whole battalion was out for three successive days at the beginning of April. (The entry for 4 April 1759 usefully directs: ‘All the shooting boards to be covered with papper and a black spot in the middle’.) After that promising start, however, all the ball ammunition was withdrawn to ensure that there were no accidents at a forthcoming review, prior to their marching off to war. As a further precaution, it was prudently arranged that all the ‘awkward men’ in the battalion would be posted on guard that day, safely out of view of the inspecting officer.
There is little doubt that the soldiers themselves were aware of the importance of good shooting, and Stewart’s order book contains a number of references to the prevalence of soldiers going out and shooting up farmers’ fences and other informal ‘marks’. Poaching was also rife.
Notwithstanding such official and unofficial practice, the common firelock was not a particularly accurate weapon beyond about 50 metres, so tactical doctrines were framed to compensate for this: lay down as heavy a fire as possible at close range.
Fighting tactics
For much of the period, infantry fighting doctrines were governed, or at least heavily influenced, by the 1728 Regulations, which had in turn been cribbed from Humphrey Bland’s elegantly written Treatise of Military Discipline, first published in 1727. The importance of Bland’s drill-book may be gauged by the fact that it went through no fewer than nine editions, the last being published in 1762.
According to Bland’s system, the battalion was divided into four grand divisions for the purposes of manoeuvre, and a much larger number of platoons for fire-control purposes. In the forming of these divisions and platoons (the two bore little or no relationship to each other), the various companies were divided up as required and only the grenadiers survived as an independent unit. The following extracts from Bland provide a useful and very clear insight into how a battalion was actually supposed to work on the battlefield:
Bland’s system of military discipline
In the Drawing up of a Battalion for Exercise, or a Review, the Ranks are to be at four ordinary Paces Distance from one another.
When they are to fire, either by Ranks, Platoons, the whole Battalion, or in the Square, the Ranks are to be moved up to half Distance, which is two Paces.
In all Wheelings, either by Division or the whole Battalion, the Ranks are to be closed forward to close Order, which is one Pace Distance.
When a Regiment is to exercise, or to be reviewed, the Files are to be opened, the Distance of which between one and another, is one Pace, or the Length of an out-stretch’d Arm; but that this may appear more plain, as soon as the Files are open’d, and the Men faced to their proper Front, order those of the Front-rank to stretch out their Right Arms to the Right, and if they can touch the left Shoulders of their Right hand Men, they have their true Distance; the doing of which now and then, will give them a just Notion of the proper Distance. As the men of the Rear-ranks are to be governed by, and dress with those in the Front, who are called their File leaders, there is no occasion for their doing it.
When they are to fire, the Files are to be at half a Pace Distance, that the Men may have room to handle their Arms in firing and loading; which Distance is the Half of an out-stretch’d Arm; that is, when the Hand is set bent against the Side, the Elbow is to touch the Right-hand Man.
In Marching or Wheeling, the Files must be so close, that the Men almost touch one another with their Shoulders.’
So far so good, but exercising proper fire-control was a little more difficult: ‘The Company of Granadiers is to be divided into two Platoons, the Captain and second Lieutenant placing themselves at the Head of that on the Right and the first Lieutenant on that on the Left. One Serjeant and one Drummer are to remain with the right Platoon, the other two Serjeants and Drummer are to march with the left Platoon.
When the Company of Granadiers is thus divided, and the Officers, Serjeants, and Drummers, have posted themselves on the Right and Left Platoons, according to the above Directions, they are to face to the Left on their right Heels, and to march to the Left beginning with the Feet they faced on. The first Lieutenant with his Platoon of Granadiers is to march along the Ranks of the Battalion until the Right-hand File of his Platoon has got one Pace beyond the Left-hand File of the Battalion, and then halt, and make them dress with the Battalion. As soon as the Left-hand File of the Right Platoon of Granadiers comes within a Pace of the Right-hand File of the Battalion, the Captain is to order them to halt, and make them dress with the others.
The Major is to order the Men to fix their Bayonets, it being the custom to perform the Firings with the Bayonets fix’d on the Muzzle; which, however, may be omitted in common Exercise, if the Commanding Officer thinks proper; but never on Service.
When the Bayonets are fixed, the Battalion is to be divided into Platoons; the Number of which must depend upon the strength of the Battalion, and the particular Firings you intend to perform. Neither is a Platoon composed of any fixed number of Files but may be more or less, according as the Battalion will allow of it; However a Platoon is seldom composed of less than 10 Files, which are 30 Men, or more than 16 Files, which are 48 Men; because a Platoon composed of less than 10 Files would not be of Weight enough to do any considerable Execution; and those above 16 Files would be too great a Body of Men for an Officer to manage upon Service.
In dividing the Battalion into Platoons, they should be composed of an equal number of Files; or at least not above one File stronger than another, and those should be the Flanks and Colour [centre] Platoons.
As soon as the Platoons are told off, there must be an Officer appointed to each, to command them; taking an equal proportion of Captains, Lieutenant and Ensigns for that Purpose.
The Lieutenant Colonel, with the remaining part of the Officers, are to march, and post themselves in the Rear of the Battalion in the same Manner as they do at Exercise, the Captains, Lieutenant and Ensigns drawing up into one Rank in the rear of the Serjeants, and the Lieutenant Colonel in the Rear of the Officers, and opposite to the Colour Platoon.
The Retreat from Concord: This action is widely held to illustrate how ill-equipped the British army was to deal with light troops, but in the circumstances Colonel Smith and his men did remarkably well. [Author’s collection]
The Serjeants should be divided to the several Platoons, and posted in the Rear of them.
The Colonel, and the Ensigns with the Colours, remain in the former Posts at the Head of the Battalion.
The Reasons for the Officers being posted in the Rear, are as follows: First, As the Interval between each Platoon should be but one Pace, the Officer who commands the Platoon is to fall into it when they fire; therefore, should any more Officers remain in the Front, than one to each Platoon, it would only embarrass and expose them to their own Fire.
Secondly. It is of great Use to have experienced Officers in the Rear, to keep the Men up, and see that they do their Duty in Action; as also to lead the Battalion off in Order, when they are commanded to retire; for which reason they place a Proportion of each Rank there. And lastly, should there be no officers in the Rear when the Battalion is ordered to the Right about, the Men would be apt to march off too fast, and by that Means break their Ranks, and fall into Confusion, or not halt in due Time; which inconveniences are prevented by Officers being posted there.
Firing by platoon
/> The Method which is now practis’d, and which by Experience, is found to be the most useful, is, the dividing of the Platoons into several Firings; each Firing being seldom composed of less than four Platoons, or more than five; which Firings are not kept together in any one part of the Battalion; but the Platoons of each Firing distributed, or disposed into different parts of the Regiment; the Reasons for disposing of them into different Parts, are these:
First. The Disposing of the Platoons of each Firing into different Parts of the Battalion, will extend your Fire in such a Manner, as to do great Execution in different Parts of the opposite Regiment; the Consequence of which, may either disable or dishearten them so much, as, upon a nearer Approach, to oblige them to give Way, or make but a faint Resistance.
Secondly. Their being divided in this Manner, should the Enemy and you join before those Platoons have Time to load, not any one Part of your Battalion is very much weakened by it; however, when the Commanding Officer apprehends that this may be the Case, he must avoid it, by leaving off after the first or second Firings, that they may all be loaded by the Time they join the Enemy in order to throw in their Whole upon them at once.
Thirdly. Should the Platoons of each Firing be together, too great a Part of the Battalion would be exposed in one Place before the men could load, particularly the Flank Firings.
Fourthly, and lastly. The Firings being thus disposed of, it makes the Exercise appear the more beautiful, and accustoms the Men to hear Firing on their Right and Left, without touching their Arms till they have Orders for it, which the English are with Difficulty brought to, from a natural Desire and Eagerness to enter soon into Action; a Quality in some cases extremely commendable, but in others the contrary; for which Reason the Men must be taught to rely entirely on the Conduct of their Officers; and to wait with Patience for their Orders, before they perform any Motion; the due Performance of which, both their Safety and Honour depend upon.’